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Abstract
This paper investigates ﬁscal sustainability in an overlapping generations economy with
endogenous growth coming from human capital formation through educational spending. We
assess how budgetary imbalances aﬀect economic dynamics and the outlook for economic
growth, thereby providing a rationale for ﬁscal rules ensuring sustainability. Our results show
that the appropriate response of ﬁscal policy to temporary shocks is not trivial in the absence of
ﬁscal rules. Fiscal rules allow for a timely reaction, thereby avoiding possibly disruptive ﬁscal
adjustment in the future: the more adjustment is delayed, the larger its necessary scale is. We
perform a rough calibration of the model to simulate the eﬀects of a demographic shock
(change in the population growth rate) under diﬀerent ﬁscal policy scenarios.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates ﬁscal sustainability in an overlapping generations economy
with endogenous growth coming from human capital formation through educational
spending. In the model, the government is allowed to run budgetary imbalances that
can lead to the emission of public debt. Excessive accumulation of public debt can
lead to a collapse of the economy by fully crowding out physical capital. A policy
is said to be sustainable1 if the corresponding intertemporal economic equilibrium
exists. The objective is to assess how budgetary imbalances aﬀect economic dynamics
and the outlook for economic growth, thereby providing a rationale for ﬁscal rules
ensuring sustainability, and to analyze the macroeconomic and budgetary impli-
cations of Europe’s population ageing.
* The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
European Central Bank. We are grateful to Barbara Annichiaricco, Bertrand Crettez, Nicola
Giammarioli, Christophe Kamps, Jose´ Marı´n Arcas, Philippe Michel and Juergen von Hagen for fruitful
discussions and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We are also grateful to two anonymous
referees of this journal for their comments.
1 On the deﬁnition of sustainability, see De la Croix and Michel (2002).
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The tax and transfer system examined in this paper is fairly rich. Pension beneﬁts
are assumed to be paid in a lump-sum manner. Individuals pay a proportional tax on
labor income and at the same time they either pay a lump-sum tax or receive a lump-
sum transfer. Labor income taxation is characterized by high top marginal tax
rates and relatively lower average eﬀective tax rates, reﬂecting the progressiveness
of income taxation. This is well captured in our model by combining a proportional
income tax with a lump-sum transfer. In addition to the tax-beneﬁt system, the
government ﬁnances general public spending – which beneﬁts individuals but does
not distort their economic decisions – and issues bonds. As individuals maximize
utility and therefore react to ﬁscal policy, the model provides a suitable framework to
inquire about ﬁscal sustainability.
There is a large and growing literature on the convenience of imposing ﬁscal rules,
as well as on their desirable properties in terms of sustainability and stabilization.
Fiscal rules are in general justiﬁed as a way to prevent governments from choosing
levels of taxation or spending that do not maximize social welfare because of political
biases (see, for example, Alesina and Perotti, 1995; or Milesi-Ferretti, 2004). Political
biases in ﬁscal policies can ultimately lead to increasing debt ratios, possibly en-
dangering ﬁscal sustainability. In dynamic models, where absence of control of the
debt dynamics may endanger sustainability, ﬁscal rules can help stabilize the dy-
namics of an economy that would otherwise be inherently unstable by maintaining
the economy on a sustainable path.
Overlapping generations models are suitable theoretical tools to address ﬁscal
sustainability issues. First, ﬁscal policy has real eﬀects on the economy (no Ricardian
equivalence). Second, since debt dynamics are in general unstable, ﬁscal rules are
needed to maintain ﬁscal sustainability. In the classical Diamond model (Diamond,
1965), where the only source of economic growth is the accumulation of physical
capital, De la Croix andMichel (2002) and Rankin and Roﬃa (2003) deﬁne and study
ﬁscal sustainability. We extend here their analysis to an endogenous growth model in
which the interest rate and the growth rate of the economy are jointly determined.
There are two sources of economic growth in our model : the accumulation of physical
capital and the formation of human capital. The accumulation of physical capital
stems from individual savings. Endogenous growth results from the formation of
human capital, which is assumed to result from parental education and educational
spending, ﬁnanced out of altruism. The human capital part of the model includes
another channel through which government debt aﬀects the economy. Not only is
physical capital crowded out by government debt but human capital as well, so that
the growth potential of the economy is aﬀected. In other words, not only is the steady
state level of capital altered, as it is in existing exogenous growth models, but also the
growth rate.
The main ﬁndings are the following. First, the existence of steady states is not
suﬃcient to ensure ﬁscal sustainability. Second, in the presence of multiple steady
states, the initial conditions in the economy matter for the long-run equilibrium that
will result from economic dynamics. Third, the stability properties of the economy
depend on the set of ﬁscal instruments, i.e., on the adopted ﬁscal rules. Fiscal policy
rules are generally needed to ensure the stability of equilibria that are dynamically
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eﬃcient. In the literature dealing with public debt, two sorts of ﬁscal policy rules have
in general been assumed:2 the constant debt policy and the constant deﬁcit policy.
We will however concentrate on the former policy (to be precise, a constant debt
to GDP ratio policy), since its implementation is much easier in our model and our
main objective is to illustrate how rules change the dynamics of the economy (for a
comparison of suggested and currently implemented operational rules, see Buiter,
2003).
The appropriate response of ﬁscal policy to exogenous temporary shocks is not
trivial in the absence of ﬁscal rules. If temporary small shocks occur in the neigh-
borhood of a stable steady state, there is no strong case for adjustments to ﬁscal
policy, as the economy can come back to its initial position by itself. However, when
temporary shocks occur in the neighborhood of an unstable steady state, which is the
standard case in an economy with public debt, they endanger ﬁscal sustainability.
Without timely reaction to such shocks, ensuring ﬁscal sustainability would require
adjustment, possibly of a disruptive nature, in the future: the more the adjustment is
delayed, the larger its necessary scale is. Fiscal rules preserving ﬁscal sustainability
seem more appropriate to deal with small shocks, as they timely maintain the econ-
omy on a sustainable path and do not lead to disruptive adjustments.
We illustrate this point by performing a rough simulation in which a baseline
version of our model, parameterized to ﬁt the values of economic variables in the pre-
enlargement European Union, is exposed to a demographic shock. To be precise, we
assume that the projected decrease in population happens in the next 50 years and
show how this can lead to unsustainable debt unless a ﬁscal rule is introduced.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the main assumptions of
our model. In Section 3, the dynamics of the state variables (human capital, physical
capital, and public debt) are discussed. In Section 4, we introduce a simulation ex-
ercise, parameterizing a baseline version of the model and analyzing its properties.
Finally, as an illustration, we assess how this baseline would react to a demographic
shock similar to the one the European Union is expected to suﬀer in the next 50 years.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
The basic framework is an overlapping generations model (Allais, 1947; Samuelson,
1958; Diamond, 1965), in which parents have an altruistic concern for their children.
Parents choose educational spending so as to maximize the expected net labor income
of their children.3 They are therefore aware that the return to education is aﬀected by
labor income taxation. The tax system is fairly rich and encompasses both pro-
portional and lump-sum labor taxes as well as old-age beneﬁts. We consider both the
2 In an overlapping generations model Marı´n (2002) and Annicchiaricco and Giammarioli (2004) examine
a ﬁscal rule whereby the primary balance is adjusted as a function of the distance between the actual and
the targeted levels of the debt and primary surplus ratios.
3 The human capital formation process is inspired by the work of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992). De la
Croix and Doepke (2003 and 2004) use a similar model whose calibration exercise we follow here (Section
4). Heterogeneity in levels of human capital can be easily introduced in the model, with results compar-
able to those obtained by these authors (Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and Vidal, 2004).
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case of balanced budget policies, whereby taxes levied on labor ﬁnance old-age beneﬁts
so that the tax system functions as a pay-as-you-go public pension scheme, and the
case of public debt, whereby the government can run budget deﬁcits or surpluses.
2.1 Households
The economy consists of a sequence of individuals who live for three periods: child-
hood, adulthood, and old-age. In the second period of their life, each individual gives
birth to 1+nt children, which is also the population growth rate when nt=ntx1
Nt=(1+nt)Ntx1,
where Nt denotes the number of individuals born in period tx1.
Individuals are educated during childhood and their human capital during adult-
hood mainly depends on their parents’ educational spending and on their parents’
human capital according to
ht+1=Ftedt h
1xd
t , (1)
where et and ht are parental spending on education and parents’ human capital,
respectively, while Ft denotes economy-wide technological progress in the ﬁeld of
education. ds(0, 1) stands for the elasticity of human capital with respect to private
educational spending. Though education policies together with individual decisions
clearly aﬀect human capital formation, we do not address this issue in this paper,
where technological progress in human capital formation is assumed to be exogenous.
During adulthood each individual born at tx1 supplies inelastically ht eﬃciency
units of labor, receives a gross labor income wtht, pays proportional (tt) and lump-
sum (gt) taxes, consumes ct, saves st, and spends (1+nt)et on education
ct+st+(1+nt)et=(1xtt)wthtxgt  vt, (2)
where vt stands for labor income net of taxes. When old individuals consume the
proceeds of their saving (Rt+1st), along with their lump-sum pension beneﬁts (Ht+1)
dt+1=Rt+1st+Ht+1, (3)
where dt+1 denotes old-age consumption.
We assume that parents ﬁnance their children’s education out of altruism.4 They
choose educational spending so as to maximize the net labor income of their children.
There is no bequest motive in the model. The inclusion of bequests would allow
parents to exercise their altruism in two diﬀerent ways: through education or bequests.
Depending on how they are modeled, operative bequests may lead to debt neutrality
and consequently to the absence of real eﬀects of ﬁscal policy when taxes and public
transfers are lump-sum (see Lambrecht et al., 2005). As our aim is to examine
government debt in a model where ﬁscal policy is eﬀective and there are risks to ﬁscal
sustainability, we assume that there are no bequests.
4 For a survey of altruism in neoclassical growth models, see Michel et al. (2006).
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Each individual born at time tx1 is endowed with the following utility function
Ut=(1xb)(ln (ct)+u(gt))+b(ln (dt+1)+u(gt+1))+c ln (vt+1), (4)
where 0<b<1 is a discount factor and c>0 is the degree of intergenerational
altruism. gt denotes the consumption of public goods in period t ; as the utility is
separable, the provision of public goods does not aﬀect the ﬁrst-order conditions. The
net labor income of children is
vt+1=(1xtt+1)wt+1ht+1xgt+1: (5)
Individuals maximize (4) under their budget constraints (2)–(3) and (5). The ﬁrst-
order conditions of an individual’s maximization problem are
1xb
Rt+1ct
=
b
dt+1
, (6)
(1xb)(1+nt)
ct
=
c(1xtt+1)wt+1Ftdedx1t h
1xd
t
vt+1
: (7)
Equation (6) determines consumptions over the life-cycle : the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between adult and old-age consumption is equal to the rate of interest.
Equation (7) determines parental educational choices. The utility loss in terms of
reduced consumption of spending one euro on children’s education is equal to the
utility gain stemming from the increase in children’s income out of altruism. Merging
equations (2) and (3) gives an individual’s life-cycle budget constraint
ct+
dt+1
Rt+1
+(1+nt)et=(1xtt)wthtxgt+
Ht+1
Rt+1
Wt, (8)
where Wt denotes life-cycle disposable income.
There is no intragenerational inequality, as all individuals belonging to the same
cohort are identical. The tax system only entails intergenerational redistribution. In
an endogenous growth model, lump-sum transfers can be linked to a growing vari-
able. We here assume that they are related to labor income at the aggregate level5
gt=~gtwtht
Ht+1=ht+1wtht: (9)
Life-cycle disposable income is therefore given by
Wt= 1xttx~gt+
ht+1
Rt+1
 
wtht=(1xTt)wtht: (10)
Tt indicates the implicit tax rate paid on labor income over the life cycle. This tax
rate is positive if the rate of interest is higher than the implicit rate of return on public
pensions : Rt+1>
ht+1
tt+~gt
.
5 Individuals perceive taxes as lump-sum when taking economic decisions. The relationship between lump-
sum taxes and wage income is an additional equilibrium condition that allows for deﬁning a balanced
growth path.
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Combining the life-cycle budget constraint (8) with condition (6), we can write
ct=(1xb)(Wtx(1+nt)et),
dt+1=bRt+1(Wtx(1+nt)et):
Plugging the expression for ct into condition (7), we obtain an equation charac-
terizing the optimal choice of educational spending
(et)
dx
cd
(1+nt)(1+cd)
Wt(et)
dx1=
gt+1
(1+cd)(1xtt+1)Ft(ht)1xd
: (11)
Together with (9), equation (11) gives the optimal education spending
et=
cd(1xtt+1) 1xttx~gt+
ht+1
Rt+1
 
wtht
(1+nt)(1xtt+1x~gt+1+cd(1xtt+1))
: (12)
The optimal consumption and saving can therefore be expressed as follows
ct=
(1xb)(1xtt+1x~gt+1)
1xtt+1x~gt+1+cd(1xtt+1)
Wt, (13)
dt+1=
bRt+1(1xtt+1x~gt+1)
1xtt+1x~gt+1+cd(1xtt+1)
Wt, (14)
st
ht
=st(Rt+1)wt, (15)
where we deﬁne
st(Rt+1)  1xttx~gtx
1xttx~gt+
ht+1
Rt+1
 
((1xb)(1xtt+1x~gt+1)+cd(1xtt+1))
1xtt+1x~gt+1+cd(1xtt+1)
0
@
1
A:
Equation (15) relates savings to wage income. The savings ratio depends on ﬁscal
policy parameters and on the expected interest rate.
2.2 Firms
In each period t, production occurs according to a Cobb–Douglas technology using
two inputs: physical and human capital. Output is given by
Yt=AtKat H
1xa
t , (16)
where Kt and Ht denote the levels of physical and human capital in period t, re-
spectively. At is a technology parameter, indicating exogenous technological progress
over time, and as(0, 1) is the share of physical capital.
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The stock of capital in period t (Kt) comes from the total savings of the preceding
period, public or private. The demand for labor (eﬀective labor or human capital)
maximizes proﬁts
Pt=max
Ht
(AtK
a
t H
1xa
t xwtHt):
The resulting wage is the competitive one
wt=(1xa)AtKat H
xa
t : (17)
The remaining proﬁts belong to capital owners so that we can deﬁne the return on
physical capital as
Rt=
Pt
Kt
=aAtKax1t H
1xa
t : (18)
2.3 Public sector
In each period, the government levies income taxes ((~gt+tt)wtHt) and pays pension
beneﬁts to retirees (htwtx1Htx1), ﬁnances public consumption Gt=(Ntx1+ Ntx2)gt,
reimburses the outstanding public debt Btx1 along with the accrued interests
(Rtx1)Btx1 and issues government bonds Bt, which will be redeemed one period later.
In period t, the government budget constraint is
Bt=RtBtx1+htwtx1Htx1x(~gt+tt)wtHt+Gt: (19)
The relevant statistical concept for public debt in the model at hand is net debt, i.e.
the diﬀerence between general government’s liabilities and assets.
3 Intertemporal equilibrium
3.1 The economic growth rate
Merging equations (1) and (12), we obtain the law of motion of human capital per
capita
ht+1=Wt(wt,Rt+1)ht (20)
where
Wt(wt,Rt+1)  Ft
cd(1xtt+1) 1xttx~gt+
ht+1
Rt+1
 
wt
(1+nt)(1xtt+1x~gt+1+cd(1xtt+1))
0
@
1
A
d
:
Assuming either that all the exogenous parameters and prices are constant over
time, which would be the case for a small open economy, or else that prices have
converged to their steady-state levels in the closed economy case, W (w, R)x1 is the
growth rate of per capita human capital.
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Labor supply in period t is equal to the aggregate level of human capital in the
economy. The aggregation of the levels of human capital of the Ntx1 individuals can
be written as: Ht=Ntx1ht. Using (20) we obtain the growth rate of aggregate human
capital : (1+nt)Wt(wt, Rt+1)x1.
3.2 Physical capital and public debt
Savings ﬁnance both physical capital and public debt, so that the following capital
market clearing condition holds
Kt+1+Bt=Ntx1st=Ntx1st(Rt+1)wtht=st(Rt+1)wtHt: (21)
The intertemporal equilibrium in this economy can thus be deﬁned as a sequence
{Kt+1, Bt+1}t=0
O satisfying the following equations
Kt+1+Bt=st(Rt+1)wtHt,
Bt+1=Rt+1Bt+ht+1wtHtx(~gt+1+tt+1)wt+1Ht+1+Gt+1:
If the growth rate of aggregate human capital is known, the dynamics of the
economy can ﬁnally be summarized by a system of two equations expressed in in-
tensive terms
kt+1=
st(Rt+1)wtxbt
(1+nt)Wt(wt,Rt+1)
, (22)
bt+1=
Rt+1bt+ht+1wt
(1+nt)Wt(wt,Rt+1)
x(~gt+1+tt+1)wt+1+gt+1: (23)
where kt=Kt/Ht, bt=Bt/Ht, and gt=Gt/Ht, and are the ratio of physical to human
capital, the ratio of public debt to human capital, and public consumption per unit of
human capital in period t, respectively.
It is well known that there are normally two steady-state solutions when we in-
troduce public debt in a standard overlapping generations economy. This is also the
case in an endogenous growth model such as the one presented here. The simulations
below aim at illustrating the functioning of the system and the consequences of
budgetary imbalances in a model calibrated with European data. We subsequently
analyze the macroeconomic and budgetary implications of population ageing in
Europe.
4 Simulations
In this section, we produce a rough calibration of the model with the objective of
providing some examples about how ﬁscal sustainability can be guaranteed in the
presence of diverse shocks. The way to proceed is to calibrate ﬁrst a baseline scenario,
where response to the mentioned shocks will then be assessed.
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4.1 Baseline scenario
The calibration of two- or three-period overlapping generations economies is not very
usual in the literature. The main diﬃculty in dealing with this issue is the need to
simulate very long time periods. In the current example, we follow De la Croix and
Doepke (2003) in assuming time periods of 30 years ; that is, a typical individual lives
for 90 years. During the ﬁrst 30 years (childhood), she just receives education; she
works, consumes, and saves during the following 30 years (adulthood); and, ﬁnally,
she lives out of her retirement pension and savings for the last 30 years (retirement).
Macroeconomic assumptions
The macroeconomic assumptions refer to the choice of the parameters that ensure
reasonable interest and growth rates in the baseline scenario. Of course, the ﬁnal
interest and growth rates also depend on public ﬁnance assumptions.
The main parameters of the model with their chosen values are shown in the fol-
lowing:
b=0.4252 Equivalent to a yearly discount rate of 0.99
c=0.169 From De la Croix and Doepke (2004)
d=0.6 From De la Croix and Doepke (2003)
a=0.3 Standard range in the literature
For the particular choice of utility function selected in this model, b represents the
weight of old-age consumption in the utility of each individual. The value chosen is
equivalent to a yearly discount factor of 0.99. This is higher than the usual estimate of
0.96 more frequently used in the literature. The qualitative conclusions of the model
are the same with both values but this higher b allows us to produce more reasonable
interest rates. c is an important parameter in this model since it represents the degree
of altruism that ultimately leads parents to worry about their children’s education.
The value of 0.169 is taken from De la Croix and Doepke (2004). They give an
alternative value of 0.271 in De la Croix and Doepke (2003) but the ﬁrst one is
preferred for the same reasons expressed in the choice of b. The same source is used
for the choice of 0.6 as the value for d, the elasticity of human capital with respect to
educational spending. The value of the capital share (a=0.3) is taken in the usual
range employed in the literature. The values chosen for the technology parameters A
and F, which are just scale parameters, are respectively 50 and 1.05.
The population growth rate assumed is 0.34% per year. This represents European
Union population growth during the 1990s (EUROSTAT 2002 Yearbook). This
population growth and technology parameters, together with the ﬁscal policy ex-
plained below give rise to a per capita output growth of 1.85% per year and a yearly
long-term interest rate of 4.73%.
Public ﬁnance assumptions
The baseline scenario is calibrated for a case in which the budget is balanced every
period and there is no net public debt. By zero net public debt, we mean that the
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government is neither a net lender to, nor a net borrower from, the other sectors of
the economy. This does not mean that the government has zero liabilities but that
government liabilities are equal to government assets. Net government debt is the
relevant concept in the model at hand; it departs from the deﬁnition of general
government gross debt as the consolidated liabilities of the general government sector,
which is usually referred to as headline debt. This calibration is broadly supported by
available empirical evidence. The net ﬁnancial liabilities of general government in the
euro area are of an order of magnitude of 50% of GDP (see OECD, 2007: 253).
Estimates of the stock of public capital (see Kamps, 2004: 7) are of the same order of
magnitude, suggesting that government net debt can be calibrated to zero. The other
ﬁscal policy parameters have been set as follows:
t=0.6 Marginal tax rate
~g=x0:2 Consistent with an eﬀective tax rate on labor income of 40%
h=0.2196 Consistent with a pension expenditure ratio over GDP of 8%
g=17.6228 Consistent with public consumption of 20% of GDP
The marginal tax rate on labor income (t) and the lump-sum tax/transfer (~g) have
been chosen with a view to replicating both the eﬀective tax rate and the high
marginal tax wedge on labor income in the European Union. The marginal tax rate
set at 60% (t=0.6) captures the high marginal tax wedge on labor income in the
European Union, where progressiveness in the statutory tax rates on personal income
is moderated by a wide range of tax allowances and tax credits and the proportion-
ality of social contributions (Joumard, 2002). Martinez-Mongay (2000) indicates that
the eﬀective tax burden on labor in the euro area was close to 40% in 1999, slightly
higher than the eﬀective tax burden in the European Union. These estimates are
corroborated by those calculated by Mendoza et al. (1994) for Germany, France,
Italy, and the United Kingdom. The diﬀerence between the European Union and the
euro area is attributable to the low eﬀective tax rate on labor in the United Kingdom
(about 25%). The choice of the lump-sum transfer (~g=x0:2) is driven by the esti-
mates for the eﬀective tax burden on labor (t+~g=0:4). Alternatively, this calibration
can be justiﬁed by the fact that taxes (13%) plus social contributions (15%) represent
28% of the European Union’s GDP for the period 1995–2000 (EUROSTAT 2002
Yearbook).6 Knowing this and given the assumption of a Cobb–Douglas production
function, we can calculate
0:28Yt=(~gt+tt)wtHt=(~gt+tt)(1xa)Yt
(~gt+tt)=
0:28
1xa
=0:4:
As for the pension parameter (h=0.2196), its value has been generated endogen-
ously from the choice of all the rest of the parameters, which have been chosen to
obtain a pension expenditure to GDP ratio of 8%. This ratio was the actual number
6 This refers to the European Union prior to the May 2004 enlargement.
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for the pre-enlargement European Union in 2000. Under budget balance, we have
htwtx1Htx1=(~gt+tt)wtHtxGt:
We can then compute the pension expenditure to GDP ratio
htwtx1Htx1
Yt
=
(~gt+tt)wtHtxGt
Yt
=(~gt+tt)(1xa)x
Gt
Yt
=0:28x0:2=8%:
Finally, g=17.6228 is chosen so as to ﬁx GtYt=20%, which is the value of govern-
ment consumption in the pre-enlargement European Union in the period 1995–2000.
In an alternative scenario, choosing b=0.2308 (0.96 yearly discount rate),
c=0.271 and a=1/3, and with ﬁscal policy parameters ~g=x0:18 and h=0.2360
(which ensure again that the pension expenditure ratio over GDP is 8%), we generate
a per capita output growth of 1.93% per year and a yearly interest rate of 7.88%.
Calibrating a two- or three-period overlapping generations model is a delicate
exercise: the limited number of parameters leaves relatively little room for maneuver,
possibly making the baseline calibration highly sensitive to change in assumptions.
The sensitivity of our baseline calibration to changes in parameters can be observed
in Table 1, in which only one parameter diﬀers from the baseline scenario in each
variant.
Steady states: existence and stability
Existence of steady states. The existence and characterization of steady states depend
critically on the assumptions about the ﬁscal policy that the government is im-
plementing. First of all, let us assume that the government ﬁxes taxes and pension
beneﬁts, as well as government consumption as a fraction of GDP and lets the
Table 1. Sensitivity of baseline calibration to changes in parameters
Growth
rate
Interest
rate
Debt
ratio
Pension
expenditure
Baseline 1.85% 4.73% 0% 8%
b=0.4 1.80% 4.90% x0.01% 8.12%
b=0.45 1.90% 4.57% 0.11% 7.89%
c=0.15 1.70% 4.49% x0.36% 8.38%
c=0.2 2.07% 5.06% 0.44% 7.50%
a=0.25 1.75% 4.18% 1.39% 8.84%
a=1/3 1.92% 5.12% x0.63% 7.47%
~g=x0:18 1.78% 4.99% 0.93% 8.19%
~g=x0:22 1.95% 4.42% x1.39% 7.79%
h=0.2 1.82% 4.78% 0.57% 7.35%
h=0.2360 1.88% 4.68% x0.51% 8.53%
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economy work by itself. The dynamics of such an economy would be governed by the
dynamic system deﬁned by equations (22) and (23). The ﬁrst question is whether or
not such an economy will converge to some steady state. To study this, we can ﬁx
all the parameters and assume kt+1=kt=k and bt+1=bt=b in these two equations.
We can then easily obtain a single non-linear equation in k, which is represented in
Figure 1.
The intersection of the black line and the x-axis represents the set of steady states
for the baseline calibration. There are two steady states resulting from this choice of
parameter values. The existence of steady states is fragile and crucially depends on
ﬁscal policy. For example, increasing government consumption from 20% to 25% of
GDP is suﬃcient to disrupt the long-term economic equilibrium, as can be seen from
Figure 1. Similar results can stem from excessive public expenditure ratios and either
excessive or insuﬃcient taxation. With our speciﬁcation of the economy, steady states
are multiple (two), unless they do not exist, except for the special case of a tangency
solution. From these two steady states, the ﬁrst one is associated with dynamic ef-
ﬁciency (under-accumulation of capital), while the second is in general in the area of
dynamic ineﬃciency.
Stability analysis and selection of a policy-relevant steady state. The dynamics of the
system can better be observed in the following phase diagram, which corresponds to
the baseline calibration (see Figure 2). First, the two steady states identiﬁed by
Figure 1 are located at the intersection of the curves kt+1=kt and bt+1=bt. Second,
we can observe what the associated net debt to GDP ratio is for each of the two
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Figure 1. Steady state of the baseline calibration
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steady states : zero for the ﬁrst steady state (it was calibrated for this to be the case)
and a net lending position of 19.89% of GDP for the second.
It can be seen from the diagram that the ﬁrst steady state is stable in the saddle path
sense, with a saddle path slightly decreasing in the net debt ratio in the proximity of
the steady state.
This means that, for any initial intensive capital value, there is only one debt level
that would lead the economy to this ﬁrst steady state, characterized by under-
accumulation of capital. Debt, however, is a stock variable and there is no mechanism
in this economy that can set the debt ratio on the saddle path so that a small per-
turbation will lead the economy to diverge from the steady state. We can notice that if
the perturbation leads to a debt level below the saddle path, the economy, evolving
according to its own law of motion, will converge to the second steady state.
However, if the perturbation leads to a higher debt level, the economy will inexorably
diverge to reach a zero capital level, unless some kind of discretionary ﬁscal policy is
adopted or new countervailing shocks happen.
As for the second steady state, it is situated to the right of the golden rule intensive
capital level. The golden rule intensive capital level is deﬁned as the solution to the
equation
R=(1+n)W(w,R):
For the baseline calibration, this value is 14.5925, which is lower than the second
steady state, situated at a level of intensive capital of 15.8052. At this steady state,
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Figure 2. Phase diagram of the baseline calibration
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thus, the economy is in an area of dynamic ineﬃciency, as deﬁned in Cass (1965). The
growth rate of the economy (in per capita terms) at this steady state is 2.53% per year
with a yearly real interest rate of 2.62%. The pension expenditure ratio amounts to
6.57% of GDP.
Why is this stable steady state not considered so carefully? The reason, in addition
to the fact that it is associated with an unusually high net lending position of general
government, is the number of studies that have established how extraordinary is that
an economy is in a dynamically ineﬃcient steady state (Mankiw et al., 1992). It must
be noticed, though, that this steady state is robust to small perturbations. Even more,
it can be said that once the economy is in this steady state, an unreasonably big shock
is required to endanger ﬁscal sustainability, as the government is a net lender to the
economy. Another justiﬁcation for not concentrating on the study of the over-
accumulation steady state is based onpolitical economyarguments.Once governments
start running budget surpluses, it is very unlikely that they will keep the same budget
policy instead of spending their extra resources. A good example of this can be found
in the United States debate about what to do with the ﬁscal surplus at the end of the
1990s.
Unsustainable debt dynamics. Coming back to the ﬁrst steady state, theory tells us
that it is inherently unstable, making ﬁscal sustainability very fragile. Suppose that
the economy situates itself with a slightly higher debt to GDP ratio than that implied
by the steady state. An example can be seen in Figure 3. The initial conditions are set
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Figure 3. Trajectory of the baseline economy starting from steady state
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at the under-accumulation steady state plus some arbitrary small amount of ad-
ditional government liabilities (0.1% of GDP). Such a small perturbation (we can
make it arbitrarily small) is suﬃcient to disequilibrate the system. If the same ﬁscal
parameters are nevertheless kept, public debt starts to accumulate, very slightly in the
ﬁrst periods but at an increasing rate. In this example, the economy would crash at
the eighth period. Remember that this is a discrete time model so that we have jumps
in the phase diagram; the jump after the seventh period would lead us to negative
capital levels, that is a collapse of the economy.
Fiscal rules ensuring sustainable debt dynamics. It could be argued that this should
not be a major concern since eight periods in this model represent actually 240 years.
It is true that it is very extreme to assume that nothing else would change in 240 years,
although some civilizations may have collapsed as a result of ﬁscal problems in such a
time span. However, the best way to reconcile this model with the behavior of real
economies is to think that the economy is never in the steady state and that the phase
diagram is continuously changing, as the long-run steady state also depends on ﬁscal
policy decisions. In this case, ﬁscal sustainability can be a more delicate issue than the
previous numerical analysis would suggest, since the instability of the system, and
hence the risks of a sustainability crisis, greatly multiplies when the economy is far
from the steady state.
Is there any way to limit this intrinsic instability of the ﬁrst steady state? The
government can proceed in two diﬀerent ways in this setup. One solution is to adopt
discretionary policies only after signiﬁcant budgetary imbalances have accumulated.
For example, the pension system can be extremely generous during one generation
putting the economy on an explosive path but then policies can change so as to
approximate a new steady state.
A more systematic solution would come from adopting a ﬁscal rule maintaining the
economy on a sustainable path. The adoption of a ﬁscal rule changes the dynamics of
the system. The ﬁscal rule that will be considered in this paper is that of a ﬁxed net
debt policy. Suppose then that the government ﬁxes a desired net debt ratio and
adjusts its ﬁscal policy instruments. In the ensuing simulations, we will keep ﬁxed the
tax parameters and will use either the pension beneﬁts (ht) or government consump-
tion (Gt) as equilibrating variables. In either case, the dynamics of the system will be
described by Figure 4, which has been drawn for the case in which the targeted net
debt ratio is 0 (budget balance). The steady state is unique here and it is globally
stable, as we know is the case in general whenever we have budget balance. We obtain
the same result for all feasible debt ratios. The set of feasible debt targets under a ﬁxed
debt policy and their associated intensive capital values are depicted in Figure 5. Any
policy aiming at sustaining a debt level over the depicted line would lead the economy
to a negative capital stock or, in other words, would not be sustainable.7
7 For a constant deﬁcit policy, there would be a maximum level of debt that would be sustainable, but there
would be no simple equation relating the size of the deﬁcit to the steady state values of capital and debt.
See De la Croix and Michel (2002) for a thorough analysis of the stability conditions of an exogenous
growth economy with a constant deﬁcit policy. In our model, the economy would converge to a steady
state level of capital and debt as long as the growth rate of the economy is positive. The only diﬀerence
with the ﬁxed debt policy is that the trajectories depicted in Figure 5 would not be linear.
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The costs of delaying ﬁscal adjustment. There are of course intermediate solutions
between the two extremes of keeping the same ﬁscal structure (Figure 3) or adopting a
ﬁscal rule (Figure 4 or 5). On the theory side (see for example Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe, 2004), ﬁscal rules usually set the tax revenue as an increasing function of
government liabilities. The adjustment speed of this function to some target level is
then chosen by the government so as to minimize some kind of loss function or,
equivalently, to maximize national welfare. Studying optimal ﬁscal policy or even the
optimal ﬁscal rule goes beyond the scope of this paper, but the eﬀect of alternative
policy scenarios can be appreciated through the following experiment. Take the ex-
ample of Figure 3 in which the economy starts from the steady state capital level but
with a small amount of public debt equivalent to 0.1% of GDP. Now suppose that
instead of not reacting to the ﬁscal crisis, the government decides to revert to a ﬁscal
rule (one implying zero debt in this case) at some point in time. Figure 6 shows the
eﬀects of this policy on the average utility8 level depending on when the government
decides to recourse to the ﬁscal rule. The costs of delaying the response to ﬁscal
problems are reﬂected in a high cost of ﬁscal stabilization during the period in which
the economy reverts to the rule and in the fact that the economy settles in a lower path
of growth after stabilization than the one that would have been attained if the
stabilization policy had been undertaken in time.
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Figure 4. Capital dynamics for a ﬁxed debt policy (b=0)
8 Average utility is obtained by assuming that u(gt)=ln (gt) so that the total utility of any given individual
would be
Ut=(1xb)( ln (ct)+ ln (gt))+b( ln (dt+1)+ ln (gt+1))+c ln (vt+1):
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In this experiment, the way in which ﬁscal stabilization is obtained is by reducing
the level of public expenditure so as to go back to a level of zero public debt. As a
result, an indirect measure of the cost of ﬁscal stabilization at diﬀerent points in time
is given by the reduction of the percentage of public expenditure over GDP that has
to be given up in order to achieve it at diﬀerent points in time. For example, suppose
that the government decides to ‘stabilize ’ after period 1 in which the level of public
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Figure 6. Average utility
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Figure 5. Dynamics of diﬀerent ﬁxed debt policies
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debt has been of 0.1% of GDP. In that case, public expenditure needs to go from
20% of GDP to 19.77% in period 2 (it immediately goes back to 20% again in period
3 once the stabilization has been obtained). If ‘stabilization’ takes place after period
2, public expenditure needs to be reduced to 19.48% of GDP for one period. After
period 3, the number would be 18.80% of GDP. After period 4, we would need to
reduce public expenditure to 17.14% of GDP. After period 5, the reduction would
have to go till 12.36% of GDP. Finally, for ‘stabilization’ to take place after period
6, a negative public expenditure ratio would be required (x11.84% of GDP), which
amounts to say that going back to a zero public debt level in one period would be
impossible just by reducing the level of public expenditure and either other measures
(reducing pension beneﬁts) or more gradual policies would be required.
Another way of stabilizing would be to choose a diﬀerent debt target after the
shock takes place. Suppose that the government decides to stabilize at a debt-to-GDP
ratio of 0.1% once the shock takes place. In the end, this is a matter of intergener-
ational redistribution. The brunt of the cost will come in the period in which stabil-
ization is decided. Setting a higher debt target would imply a lower capital steady state
that would be reﬂected in lower growth rates and lower utility for the rest of the
periods.
4.2 Fiscal sustainability and population ageing
The issue of ﬁscal sustainability has become increasingly popular in Europe in re-
lation to the possibility or impossibility of keeping unchanged the public pension
arrangements in view of the estimates of population decrease over the next 50 years.
We will analyze what the prediction of our model for this particular case is.
The demographic shock consists of a change in the population growth rate. The
EPC-Budgetary challenges posed by population ageing projects (Section 2.2) that the
total population of the European Union (before enlargement) will go from 376.4
million in 2000 to 364.2 million in 2050. This gives us a yearly population decrease of
0.07% per year that we must compare to the yearly population growth of 0.34%
assumed in the baseline scenario. The way we introduce the shock is by assuming that
x0.07%will be the generation growth rate after two periods (in the new steady state),
that is nt+2=(1–0.0007)30. The transition is modeled by choosing nt+1 so that the total
population after two periods is 364:2376:4
 60
50 times that of the baseline.9
Figure 7 compares the baseline with the new dynamic system around the dynami-
cally eﬃcient steady state. We can see that the new steady state is characterized by
higher intensive capital level and a net government debt ofx0.27%. The per capita
growth rate associated with the new steady state would be 2.15% (compared with
1.85% in the baseline) and the interest rate 4.57% (compared with 4.73%). Keeping
the same policy parameters, the pension expenditure ratio would increase to 8.28%
of GDP (0.28% of GDP higher than the baseline).
The reason why the new steady state features higher growth comes from the
structure of the model. Growth is generated by investment in human capital. A lower
9 We elevate to the power of 1/50 because the reference date we have is 2050 with respect to 2000 and to the
power of 60 because we take two complete 30-year periods.
294 J. F.-H. Moraga and J.-P. Vidal
population growth rate allows each parent to invest more in each of the remaining
children so that they will have a higher per capita human capital that will show up as
a general higher growth rate in all the relevant variables in the economy.
Importantly, it is misleading and dangerous to compare directly two steady states.
By looking at Figure 7, we can realize that the economy would not go to the new
steady state. In fact, we can run a simulation to see what would happen if policy
parameters remain unchanged. The result can be seen in Figure 8, illustrating how the
economy would crash ﬁve periods after the population shock happens under no
policy changes.
It could be of interest seeing the evolution of some signiﬁcant variables in the
economy along the dynamic path. This can be observed in Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12. It
is remarkable that the eﬀect on the interest and growth rate is not really alarming at
any point and it is very diﬃcult to deduce that the economy is heading to a disaster. In
this respect, neither growth nor the interest rate seems to be a useful indicator of ﬁscal
sustainability by itself.
The picture is diﬀerent if we concentrate on other variables. For example, the
behavior of debt and deﬁcit is clearly explosive (Figure 10). Figure 11 shows that the
main ratios in the economy: consumption to GDP (around 62.7% in the baseline),
savings to GDP (14.4% in the baseline) and private education to GDP (2.9%) also
react importantly to demographic shock. Finally, the ratio of pension expenditure to
GDP also increases along the dynamics caused by the shock (Figure 12).
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We discussed in the previous section that ﬁscal rules could prevent the economy
from entering into unsustainable dynamics. In this case, we will ﬁrst analyze what is
the eﬀect of adopting a ﬁscal rule of budget balance (zero net debt). When we want to
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Figure 9. Eﬀects of the demographic shock
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Figure 8. Dynamics in a no-change of policy scenario
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impose budget balance or any other ﬁxed debt policy, we can use either government
consumption or pension beneﬁts as equilibrating variables. If we use the latter (pension
reform), most of the relevant variables in the economy stay unchanged (the ratios
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Figure 11. Eﬀects of the demographic shock
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Figure 10. Eﬀects of the demographic shock
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presented in the previous charts). There are of course repercussions on the growth
rate per capita and interest rate that can be observed in Figure 13.
The change in the pension beneﬁts does not aﬀect the pension expenditure to GDP
ratio, but it is nevertheless interesting to know by how much pension beneﬁts have to
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Figure 13. Eﬀect of the demographic shock under budget balance
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Figure 12. Eﬀects of the demographic shock on pension expenditure over
GDP
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decrease to attain budget balance. This calculation is presented in Figure 14. Beneﬁts
can remain unchanged for the ﬁrst period but must be reduced by more than 8% in
the following one. Once the economy stabilizes in the new steady state, beneﬁts can be
upgraded slightly but would remain 4% below their original level in spite of the
higher growth rate associated with the new steady state.
Another possibility for the government to ensure budget balance is to reduce
government consumption, while maintaining pension beneﬁts. The eﬀect is exactly
the same as was observed in Figure 13 for the interest and growth rates per
capita. However, the reaction of other macroeconomic variables is diﬀerent, as can be
seen in Figures 15 and 16. Figure 15 shows that the consumption to GDP ratio
increases by 0.6% in the new steady state with respect to the baseline, whereas the
savings ratio goes down by some 0.5% of GDP and educational spending with re-
spect to GDP also increases by 0.28%. In Figure 16, we can see how the pension
expenditure to GDP ratio evolves when we keep beneﬁts unchanged. It increases by
3.9% of GDP with respect to the baseline in the new steady state. Finally, the
necessary reaction of government consumption to equilibrate the economy implies
a decrease by 1.6% of GDP.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to analyze ﬁscal sustainability in an overlapping
generations economy in which government imbalances are allowed. The conclusions
that can be drawn from this study are the following.
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Figure 15. Eﬀect of the demographic shock under budget balance
300 J. F.-H. Moraga and J.-P. Vidal
First, it is not suﬃcient to concentrate on steady state analysis. Fiscal policy is
sustainable if the economic equilibrium exists in all periods. This is a general obvious
point that we want to make here because of its particular relevance in this model.
Importantly, in the demographic shock studied in this paper, it is clear that the new
steady state is characterized by higher growth rates and lower interest rates than the
one before the shock. However, the economy, led by its own dynamics without any
change in ﬁscal policy, would never attain the new more favorable steady state, but
would instead be led to an unsustainable situation.
Second, it must be emphasized that ﬁscal sustainability can be extremely fragile.
All the indicators in an economy may remain at ‘normal ’ levels, while the economy is
actually in an unsustainable situation.
Third, ﬁscal policy rules seem to be necessary to ensure ﬁscal sustainability. The
government cannot remain passive in front of the shocks that aﬀect the economy. It
must react to those shocks in a way that situates the economy on sustainable paths
with a view to preventing the accumulation of signiﬁcant budgetary imbalances
leading to disruptive adjustments. Under ﬁscal rules, such as a constant debt policy in
the framework developed in this paper, the dynamic properties of the economy
change and the equilibrium becomes stable.
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